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Abstract
The farmer share of retail prices is shown to be about 16 percent,
corresponding to about 84 percent of a distribution share, on average
across agricultural products and regions within Turkey. The share of
transportation costs in retail prices is only about 7 percent, while the
share of retail margins is about 77 percent of retail prices. The disper-
sion of retail prices across regions is shown to be mostly due to local
wages and variable markups, while the contribution of traded-input
prices is relatively small. Accordingly, the high dispersion of farmer
prices across locations is not reected in the dispersion of retail prices
due to the high contribution of retail margins. These retail margins
are also shown to account for about one third of the consumer welfare
dispersion across regions and more than half of the consumer welfare
dispersion across products.
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1 Introduction
The portion of agricultural retail prices received by farmers, the so-called farmer share, is
about 15 percent across countries (e.g., see Canning et al., 2016). Accordingly, the distribu-
tion share consisting of transportation costs and retail margins constitute the bigger portion
of retail prices. The decomposition of this distribution share into its components is impor-
tant to understand the welfare and policy implications for both consumers and farmers. For
example, if the distribution share is high due to transportation costs, the optimal policy to
improve welfare would be to reduce them through investments on infrastructure or subsidies
on transportation-related costs, while if the distribution share is high due to retail margins,
they can be subject to e¤ective price regulations that can increase consumer welfare due to
lower prices and increase farmer welfare due to higher sales (e.g., see Sheshinski, 1976; Selim,
2015; Serra, 2015). Since retail margins increase with the market share (e.g., see Hong and
Li, 2017), the e¤ects of retail margins (and thus the corresponding price regulation) may
even be higher in regions with higher market power. Accordingly, it is essential to have a de-
composition of the distribution share both an average and across regions to achieve optimal
policies.
This paper achieves such a decomposition by using retail- and farm-level micro price data
on agricultural products across Turkish regions. In order to have an empirical motivation
and implications for welfare, a simple model is introduced, where the economic environment
consists of regions inhabited by individuals who consume local retail goods and retailers who
purchase traded-inputs from producers subject to transportation costs. Since we empirically
focus on individual products of green groceries, producers correspond to farmers who produce
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homogenous goods. Accordingly, each retailer searches for the minimum price across farmers
at the product level, subject to transportation costs. Once transportation costs and source
farms are identied through estimations based on price data obtained from both farmers and
retailers, traded-input prices are determined for retailers. By further introducing a structure
on local retail costs through the model, the retail prices are decomposed into farmer prices
and distribution costs (consisting of transportation costs and retail margins).
The empirical results show that the farm share is about 16 percent of retail prices on
average across agricultural goods and regions, corresponding to about 84 percent of a distri-
bution share; this is consistent with studies such as by Canning et al. (2016) as introduced
above. The share of transportation costs in retail prices is only about 7 percent, while retail
margins (dened as the ratio of retail to traded-input prices including transportation costs)
are about 4.47, implying that about 77 percent of retail prices are accounted for by the
retail sector. This result corresponds to slightly higher transportation costs within Turkey
compared to similar costs in the U.S. of about 4 percent as shown by Elitzak (1997) for food
products. This may be surprising, because the U.S. is a much more spatially dispersed econ-
omy (due its land size) and thus one may expect lower transportation costs within Turkey.
Nevertheless, since transportation costs between farmers and retailer highly depend on fuel
prices as shown by Volpe et al. (2013), the di¤erence in transportation costs of Turkey
and the U.S. can easily be attributed to ratio of fuel prices in Turkey to those in the U.S.
which has an average of about 2.6 between 1994 and 2011 according to World Development
Indicators.
When a comparison is achieved across regions, the dispersion of retail prices is mostly
due to local wages and variable markups (95 percent), while the contribution of traded-
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input prices is relatively small (5 percent). When we further investigate the dispersion of
traded-input prices across locations, the contribution of transportation costs dominate by 95
percent, while that of source prices is only 5 percent. It is implied that the high dispersion of
farmer prices across locations is not reected in the dispersion of retail prices due to factors
such as local input costs, variable markups, and transportation costs. It is also shown that
retail margins are dispersed across regions at the product level. The implications of the
model suggest that the dispersion of retail margins (across regions) is explained 52 percent
by traded-input prices, and 48 percent by local wages and variable markups. Since the
dispersion of traded-input prices is mostly due to transportation costs, it is implied that
nal consumers face di¤erent retail margins across locations due to all of transportation
costs, local wages and variable markups.
Finally, using the implications of the model for consumer welfare, on average across
individual products, about 30 percent of the consumer welfare dispersion is explained by
retail margins across locations, while another 70 percent is explained by di¤erences in either
real economic sizes of regions or traded-input prices. On the other hand, within the same
location, retail margins contribute by about 60 percent to the consumer welfare dispersion
across products. Hence, the retail margin (that can be mostly explained by local wages and
variable markups) is one of the key variables in understanding the dispersion of consumer
welfare across regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces Turkish data
on farmer and retailer prices. Section 3 introduces a summary of the model and the empirical
methodology. Section 4 depicts the empirical results. Section 5 discusses the implications
for price dispersion across locations and goods, while Section 6 depicts the implications
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for consumer welfare dispersion. Section 7 concludes. The technical details of the model,
together with those of the empirical methodology, are given in the Appendix.
2 Data
Turkish consumers purchase major portion of their green groceries (i.e., produce commodities
of fruits and vegetables) from open street markets called bazaars, where sellers are either local
farmers or intermediaries; however, prices of the products sold in bazaars are not recorded.
Nevertheless, consumers still purchase about 15 percent of their green groceries from retailers
(see Koc et al., 2007 and Bignebat et al., 2009). Since prices at the retail level are recorded
at the product level across regions of Turkey, we focus on such prices in this paper. The
location and product denition of these retail prices are matched with those of prices received
by farmers who sell their products to either wholesalers or retailers (rather than selling them
directly at the bazaar or to intermediaries who sell them at the bazaar).1
The prices received by farmers cover 111 products from 81 provinces of Turkey, while
retail prices cover 440 products from 26 regions of Turkey, where regions are dened as
combinations of the very same 81 provinces. Prices received by farmers are per unit rst
hand selling prices of products (on average across farmers) which are produced or grown
and presented to market by producers who are engaged in agriculture; these prices are
value added tax exclusive. Retail prices represent per unit average price across retailers
within a particular region; these prices are also value added tax inclusive.2 We focus on the
1The data have been downloaded from http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/ where interested readers may nd
further information.
2Since multiplicative value added taxes are determined nationwide within Turkey, they would easily be
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intersection of these two data sets covering 37 products. In order to match the location of
farmer prices with the location of retail prices, we take the average of farmer prices across
provinces forming each retail region at the product level. Therefore, the version of the data
we use consists of 37 products from 26 regions.3 For each product and region, we employ
the average prices across the years of 2010 and 2011 in order to eliminate the transitory
variations in prices, such as the ones due to product-and-year specic shocks emerging from
weather conditions or "sales" events in retailers.4 The prices are in Turkish liras. A typical
observation in the nal version of the data is the price of cauliower per kilogram obtained
from the region consisting of the provinces of Kirikkale, Aksaray, Nigde, Nevsehir, Kirsehir;
the price is 2.20 Turkish liras at the retail level, while it is 0.42 Turkish liras at the farmer
level. This simple example gives clues regarding the distribution or retail margin for green
groceries, although we need to consider the full sample in order to talk about a systematic
approach.
When retail prices are compared with farmer prices collected from the very same regions,
retail prices are about the twice as farmer prices on average across regions. However, the
retailer in each region can purchase products from other regions if they would see an arbitrage
opportunity (after considering transportation costs). We also observe that the retail prices in
captured by good xed e¤ects in a typical regression where the dependent variable would be log retail prices,
which is exactly the case in this paper.
3The list of the products is given in Online Appendix Table A.1, while the list of regions (and the provinces
forming them) is given in Online Appendix Table A.2
4For interested readers, such e¤ects are discussed in studies such as by Azzam, (1999), Peltzman (2000)
or Chen et al. (2008) who show that the transmission of price changes between farmers and retailers is
generally delayed, incomplete, and asymmetric.
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any region are, on average, six times the lowest farmer prices across all regions; therefore, as
long as transportation costs are lower than the farmer price di¤erence between local farmers
and distant farmers, retailers would purchase products from the distant farmers.
The price dispersion across regions (measured by the coe¢ cient of variance across re-
gions for each product in order to control for the scale e¤ects in the measure of standard
deviation) ranges between 0.001 (for banana) and 0.308 (for tomato) for retail prices, while
it ranges between 0.192 (for banana) and 0.648 (for purslane) for farmer prices. Hence, on
average across products, farmer prices are much more dispersed across regions compared to
retail prices. This important observation is consistent with the magnitude of the arbitrage
opportunities discussed above, because higher dispersion in farmer prices (across regions)
means a greater possibility to encounter a lower farmer price in a distant region.
In this paper, by using the implications of a trade model, we investigate whether the
potential arbitrage opportunities are taken by retailers on green groceries across regions.
Since such arbitrage opportunities are connected to the distance measures across regions,
we calculate the great circle distance (in miles) between each region pair by considering the
average geographical location of each region (dened as the average longitude/latitude of
provinces within that region).5 Finally, in order to identify markups and marginal costs, we
consider local wages for which we use region-specic measures of "Maid and CleanersFee"
which is one of the 440 products (covering all 26 regions of Turkey) in the original retail-level
price data set.6
5The internal distance within each region is calculated as the average bilateral distance across the
provinces forming that region.
6The corresponding distribution of wages across regions is given in Online Appendix Figure A.1. As is
evident, Turkish wages range between 27.90 (for Mardin, Batman, Sirnak, Siirt) and 78.85 (for Istanbul)
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3 Model and Estimation Methodology
We are interested in understanding the retail/distribution margins of green groceries by
introducing a model that is consistent with the existing literature; we further would like
to connect the implications of such margins for consumer welfare. Accordingly, we model
retailers that sell green groceries (to the nal consumers) that they purchase from farmers.
The economic environment consists of regions that are inhabited by individuals, retailers
and farmers. We do not model the wholesalers on purpose, because the wholesale of green
groceries is regulated in Turkey where wholesalers receive 8 percent of their sales price,
which corresponds to a gross constant markup of about 1.087 at the wholesale level (see
Lemeilleur et al., 2007; Bignebat et al., 2009). Since such constant markups only correspond
to scale e¤ects in retail prices, they are practically controlled by any constant in a typical
regression where log retail prices represent the dependent variable. This paper achieves such a
regression analysis, below (i.e., we choose to control for the e¤ects of wholesalers empirically);
accordingly, we keep the model simple by skipping the unnecessary details of wholesalers,
although our measures for retail markups/margins will include wholesale markups/margins
as well.
Following Behrens and Murata (2007), individuals in each region maximize their utilities
based on non-CES preferences; this leads us having variable markups through the optimiza-
tion problem of the retailers who are assumed to have market power due to the factors that
di¤erentiate their product, such as their location, brand, or packaging strategy. This is in
line with studies such as by Sexton et al. (2003) who have shown that grocery retailers ex-
across regions.
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ercise market power over consumers and by Gardner (1975) who has shown that a constant
markup (dened as a xed percentage margin) cannot accurately depict the relationship
between the farm and retail prices. Other studies have conrmed this by showing that retail
price variations reect changes in retail margins rather than changes in costs (see Conlisk,
et al., 1984; MacDonald, 2000; Pesendorfer, 2002; Hosken and Rei¤en, 2004).
The retailer in each region purchases green groceries as traded-inputs and combine them
with local input (e.g., local labor) in order to produce the nal retail product; this is con-
sistent with studies such as by Elitzak (1997) who shows that traded-inputs and local labor
highly dominate all other inputs with their share in retailing of farm products. For each
product sold, the retailers search for the minimum price farmers across all regions due to
the homogenous structure of green groceries; this is in line with Rauch (1999) who has cre-
ated a well-accepted categorization of traded goods where green groceries are categorized as
homogenous products.7
The technical details of the model are given in the Online Appendix, while a summary
of the model is depicted here. According to the model, marginal costs of retailing (implied
by a Cobb-Douglas retail-production function) for good g in region r are given as follows:
cgr = (f
g
r )
 (wr)
1  (1)
where f gr represents the traded input price of good g, and wr represents the per unit price/cost
of the local input (e.g., wages) that is common across goods. In equilibrium,  represents
7We ignore any imported green groceries in the model, because Turkey is a net exporter of these prod-
ucts by a great margin. In particular, Turkey has exported 6,152 (6,695) million U.S. dollars worth of
green groceries, while importing only 757 (952) million U.S. dollars worth of them in 2010 (2011). Source:
http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/.
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the sum of farm share and transportation share, while 1  represents the retail share of the
retail price; the sum of transportation and retail shares further represents the distribution
share. The prot maximization results in the following price expression:
pgr = 
g
rc
g
r (2)
where gr represents gross variable retail markups (that change with quantity sold). The
retail margin rmgr is implied as follows:
rmgr =
pgr
f gr
= gr

wr
f gr
1 
(3)
which is a function of retail markups, traded-input prices and local retail costs. Since
agricultural goods are homogenous when they leave the production farms, the retailer in
each region searches for the lowest price across potential farmers, by taking into account the
transportation costs between the farmer and the retailer. Accordingly, traded-input prices f gr
for the retailer in region r are connected to the producer prices by the following expression:
f gr = f
g
rs + drs (4)
where f grs is the producer price of good g at the source region s for the retailer in region
r. It is important to emphasize that f grs changes across destinations due to the retailer (in
each region r) searching for the lowest-price farm, after considering the transportation costs;
hence, the source farm for each retailer may well be di¤erent. Transportation costs are
represented by drs where drs is the distance between the source/producer and the retailer
in miles, and  is the transportation cost per mile per unit of good transported. Substituting
this expression into the log retail prices, the model implies the following expression as shown
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in the Online Appendix:
ln pgr =

2
ln (f grs + drs)| {z }
Traded-Input Prices
+ g + r + "
g
r (5)
which can be estimated using data on prices (pgr and f
g
rs), good xed e¤ects 
g, and destina-
tion xed e¤ects r, subject to the determination of the source farm. As shown in the Online
Appendix, we achieve the latter by using Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) where we
search for the parameter of  that maximizes the explanatory power of the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression that minimizes the contribution of the residual sum of squares.
In terms of economic intuition, this strategy corresponds to calculating the arbitrage op-
portunities of the retailers across farmers (i.e., searching for the minimum-cost producer)
after controlling for transportation costs. Accordingly, when data for retail-level prices pgr
and farm-level prices f gs for all r, s and g are available, both  and  are identied; thus,
the source region (i.e., the lowest-price farm, after considering transportation costs) and the
source prices f grs (= mins (f
g
rsj g)) for each retailer is identied at the good level.
4 Empirical Results
The estimation results for Equation 5 are given in Table 1. As is evident, the share of traded
inputs  is estimated as 0.15; it is signicant at the 5 percent level. It is implied that local
retail costs correspond to about 85 percent of overall retail costs for green groceries in Turkey.
If we presume that local retail costs are correlated with the local income/wage (as in Crucini
et al., 2005; or Crucini and Yilmazkuday, 2014), this result is consistent with the "Penn
e¤ect" which implies that prices are higher in high-income regions. The transportation cost
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per mile per unit of good transported  is estimated as 0:32 10 3, which is also signicant
at the 5 percent level; it corresponds to a transportation cost of about 3.2 Turkish kurus (i.e.,
0.032 Turkish lira) per 100 miles per unit of good transported. The results are supported
by the high explanatory power. Nevertheless, we are mostly interested in the implications
of these estimates rather than their pure values, which we focus on next.
We start with the product-level implications on the ratio of estimated transportation
costs bdrs to the estimated source prices cf grs:
 grs =
bdrscf grs (6)
which is for the retailer located in region r that purchases good g from the farmer in region
s (i.e., the lowest-price farm, after considering transportation costs). This ratio provides
useful information on transportation costs as a portion of source prices, which is a standard
measure (for comparison purposes) across products and/or regions. As shown in Table 2,
the average of this ratio (across products and regions) is about 0.39 with a range of between
0.02 and 2.13.8 Therefore, on average, a green grocery product that is worth 1.00 Turkish
lira at the source farm is transported for about 39 Turkish kurus (i.e., 0.39 Turkish liras) to
the destination retailer.
An alternative transportation cost measure can also be considered, this time based on
the ratio of estimated transportation costs bdrs to the tted retail prices bpgr:
 grs =
bdrsbpgr (7)
which corresponds to the transportation share of retail prices. As also shown in Table 2, the
8For this and later ratios, the corresponding distributions (across products and regions) are given in
Online Appendix Figure A.1.
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average transportation costs represent about 7 percent of the retail price, on average across
goods and locations. This corresponds to slightly higher transportation costs within Turkey
compared to similar costs in the U.S. of about 4 percent as shown by Elitzak (1997) for food
products. This may be surprising, because the U.S. has a much more spatially dispersed
economy and thus one may expect lower transportation costs within Turkey. Nevertheless,
since transportation costs between farmers and retailer highly depend on fuel prices as shown
by Volpe et al. (2013), the di¤erence in transportation costs of Turkey and the U.S. can
easily be attributed to long-run ratio of fuel prices in Turkey to those in the U.S. which has
an average of about 2.6 between 1994 and 2011 according to World Development Indicators.
We estimate the product-level gross retail margin rmgrs as follows:
rmgr =
bpgrbf gr (8)
which is the ratio of the tted retail prices bpgr to the tted traded-input price bf gr (including
transportation costs) for the retailer in region r regarding good g. As is evident in Table
2, gross retail margins have an average of about 4.47 with a range between 1.48 and 15.04
across products and regions. Thus, on average, a retailer sells a green grocery product, for
which she pays 1.00 Turkish liras, for about 4.47 Turkish liras. For sure, this retail margin
includes both local retail costs and markups, which we will discuss in details, below.
The gross distribution margin dmgrs at the product level is estimated as follows:
dmgrs =
bpgrcf grs (9)
which is the ratio of tted retail prices bpgr to the tted source price cf grs (excluding transporta-
tion costs) for the retailer in region r that purchases good g from the farmer in region s.
This ratio also corresponds to one over the farm share in retail prices. As depicted in Table
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2, gross distribution margins have an average of 6.10 with a range of 2.21 and 17.37. Thus,
on average, a green grocery product that is sold for 1.00 Turkish lira by the producer/farmer
is sold for about 6.10 Turkish liras in a typical retailer. It is implied that the distribution
share (i.e., the sum of transportation share and retail share) of retail prices is about 84
percent, while the farm share is about 16 percent, on average across goods and regions. This
estimated farm share is line with those in the U.S. (14 percent) and Canada (17 percent) as
shown by Canning et al. (2016).
Since prices are given as pgr = 
g
r (f
g
r )
 (wr)
1  according to the model, one can identify
the multiplication of markups gr and local costs (wr)
1  by using the estimation results (that
provide information on  and f gr ). However, the empirical strategy that we have used so far
does not allow us to identify markups gr versus marginal costs of retailers c
g
r. Accordingly,
we take a stand on our model by considering the implications on local costs which we proxy
by local wages (as dened in the data section). We achieve this by using the following
expression for markups:
bgr = bpgr bf gr b (wr)1 b (10)
for which we use tted retail prices bpgr, data on wages wr, tted traded-input prices bf gr ,
and the estimated coe¢ cient of b. Since there are potential scale issues between prices and
wages, we normalize the implied markups by setting the minimum markup equal to one. The
descriptive statistics on estimated markups are given in Table 2, where, on average, gross
retail markups are about 4.29.
In sum, Table 2 reveals information on how large the distribution and retail margins
can be, while the contribution of transportation costs on retail prices are relatively minor.
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However, the distribution of such variables is also of particular interest, because we simply
would like to know why there are di¤erences across regions and/or products regarding retail
prices, potentially determined by distribution and retail margins as well as transportation
costs. While the dispersion across regions would have implications for the Law of One Price
(LOP), which states that the price of the same product across two di¤erent locations should
be the same, the dispersion across products is essential for understanding the contribution
of product-specic retail margins/markups to the retail prices, which is among the questions
often asked about retail margins (see Wohlgenant, 2001). Such a systematic explanation can
be achieved by considering the dispersion of these variables across regions and/or products,
which we achieve next.
5 Implications for Price Dispersion
We start with the investigation of the price dispersion at the retail level by considering
prices pgr = 
g
r (f
g
r )
 (wr)
1  given by the model. The variance decomposition of log prices is
implied as follows by :
var (ln pgr)| {z }
Price Dispersion
= cov (lngr ; ln p
g
r)| {z }
Due to Markups
+ cov ((1  ) lnwr; ln pgr)| {z }
Due to Local Retail Costs
(11)
+ cov ( ln f gr ; ln p
g
r)| {z }
Due to Traded-Input Prices
which is achieved by taking covariance of both sides of the log retail price expression with
respect to log retail prices. Equation 11 holds with equality due to the properties of the vari-
ance operator var and the covariance operator cov. Since the variance operator considers
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the deviations from the sample mean by construction, considering the price dispersion across
regions would directly corresponds to the deviations from LOP. We achieve this by using
Equation 11 for each good g individually. The corresponding results for the price dispersion
across regions are given in Table 3, where the contribution of local retail costs and markups
dominate the contribution of traded-input prices on average across products. In particular,
local retail costs contribute to the price dispersion by about 65 percent, while retail markups
contribute by about 30 percent. Therefore, retail margins (rather than overall distribution
margins or transportation costs) are essential for understanding the deviations from LOP.
The relatively low contribution of traded-input prices in Table 3 also provides insights re-
garding why the high dispersion of producer prices is reduced to lower levels at the retail
level.
When we replicate the same analysis for the retail price dispersion across goods, the
contribution of traded-inputs is relatively higher; this is expected, because products poten-
tially have di¤erent characteristics. Nevertheless, the contribution of markups dominates
the price dispersion across goods, partly by construction, because local retail costs are the
same across goods within a particular region. Therefore, whenever retail prices of di¤erent
products within the same region are compared, the dispersion is mostly due to product-
specic retail markups gr rather than the characteristics of the products reected in their
production or transportation costs.
We continue with investigating the determinants of traded-input prices f gr (= f
g
rs + drs)
using the same variance decomposition methodology, where we use the following expression:
var (f gr )| {z }
Dispersion
= cov (f grs; f
g
r )| {z }
Due to Source Prices
+ cov (drs; f
g
r )| {z }
Due to Transportation Costs
(12)
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The corresponding results are given in Table 3, where the product-level dispersion of traded-
input prices across regions is mostly due to transportation costs rather than source prices. It
is implied that the search of the retailers for the minimum price farm results in very similar
source prices across farms, while such source prices di¤erentiate at the destination retailer
when transportation costs are added. The dispersion across goods is dominated by source
prices, mostly reecting the good characteristics within the very same destination region.
The retail margins are implied as follows:
rmgrs =
pgr
f gr
=
gr (f
g
r )
 (wr)
1 
f gr
= gr

wr
f gr
1 
(13)
of which log version can be written as follows for a variance decomposition analysis:
var (ln rmgrs)| {z }
Dispersion
= cov (lngr ; ln rm
g
rs)| {z }
Due to Markups
+ cov

ln (wr)
1  ; ln rmgrs

| {z }
Due to Local Retail Costs
(14)
+cov

ln (f gr )
 1 ; ln rmgrs

| {z }
Due to Traded-Input Prices
The corresponding results are depicted in Table 3. As is evident, traded inputs explain most
of the retail-margin dispersion across regions at the product level with a contribution of about
52 percent, followed by variable markups with a contribution of about 29 percent; only about
17 percent is explained by local retail costs. Therefore, when we compare the retail margins of
the very same product across locations, on average across goods, the di¤erence is attributed
to all of traded-input prices, local retail costs and markups. It is also implied that retailers
facing di¤erent traded-input prices set alternative retail margins. Similarly, when the retail
margins of the same region is compared across di¤erent products, on average across regions,
variable markups explain the lions share of the dispersion, followed by traded-input prices.
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Finally, we investigate the dispersion of marginal costs by using the log version of cgr =
(f gr )
 (wr)
1  as follows:
var (ln cgr)| {z }
Dispersion
= cov

ln (f gr )
 ; ln cgr

| {z }
Due to Traded-Input Prices
+ cov

ln (wr)
1  ; ln cgr

| {z }
Due to Local Retail Costs
(15)
The results given in Table 3 suggest that the contribution of local retail costs dominate when
dispersion across regions is considered at the product level, while traded-input prices domi-
nate (by construction since local retail costs (wr)
1  cancel each other out) when dispersion
across goods is considered at the regional level. Thus, regarding the implications for LOP,
although retailers in di¤erent regions face di¤erent marginal costs due to the di¤erences in
local retail costs, such di¤erences partly disappear when retail markups/margins are set as
the dominant factor.
6 Implications for Consumer Welfare Dispersion
As shown in the Online Appendix, the model implies the following expression for consumer
welfare at the good level:
U gr =   ln (f grs + drs)| {z }
Due to Traded-Input Prices
  ln rmgrs| {z }
Due to Retail Margins
+ r + 
g (16)
which depends on traded-input prices, retail margins, the real economic size (represented by
r), and good specic factors (represented by 
g). Using the tted markups (as in Equation
10) as the left hand side variable and considering the tted values of traded-input prices,
retail margins, destination xed e¤ects, and good xed e¤ects as the right hand side variables,
the same variance decomposition methodology (by taking the covariance of both sides of this
17
expression with respect to qgr ), the results in Table 4 are obtained.
As is evident, retail margins contribute by about 30 percent to the dispersion of consumer
welfare across locations, while the combination of traded-input prices and the real economic
size of regions has another contribution of about 70 percent; good characteristics cancel each
other out across locations by construction. Similarly, consumers within the same location
receive di¤erent sub-utilities from di¤erent products due to the dispersion of retail margins
across products (with a contribution of about 60 percent) followed by traded-input prices.
Therefore, retail margins are important determinants of the dispersion of consumer welfare
across locations and products.
7 Conclusion
The decomposition of retail prices into producer prices, transportation costs and retail mar-
gins is important to understand the welfare implications of alternative policies. This paper
has shown by using Turkish micro price data on agricultural products that retail margins
explain the lions share of retail prices, followed by producer prices and transportation costs.
It is implied that the high dispersion of producer prices across locations is suppressed by lo-
cal retail margins, and the dispersion of retail prices does not reect that of producer prices;
instead, it reects di¤erences across locations due to local input costs and variable markups.
Retail margins are shown to be dispersed across locations mostly due to traded-input prices
faced by retailers, followed by the contributions of variable markups and local input costs.
When these retail margins are further connected to the dispersion of consumer welfare across
locations, it is shown that about one third of consumer welfare di¤erences can be attributed
18
to retail margin di¤erences. Within the same location, retail margins also explain more than
half of the consumer welfare dispersion across products.
It is important to emphasize that our measures regarding markups/margins of retailers
include that of wholesalers as well, although they do not a¤ect any of our analyses based on
dispersion across locations or products, because wholesale margins are constant across loca-
tions and products according to the Turkish regulations (see Lemeilleur et al., 2007; Bignebat
et al., 2009) for the products in our sample. The results also have important implications for
potential markets that connect farmers directly with nal consumers (i.e., direct-to-consumer
sales). In particular, since the contributions of local retail costs and variable markups to
retail prices dominate that of producer farm prices, there is room for potential increases in
both farmer and consumer welfare through such innovations. As discussed by Bignebat et
al. (2009), this is important especially in Turkey, where producers are not aware of the nal
buyer of their produce due to the intermediaries hindering the visibility of the marketing
channel. Nevertheless, as shown by Park et al. (2014), if such direct-to-consumer sales come
with the lack of management and marketing skills, farmer welfare may easily go down due
to lower earnings. In sum, any optimal policy should consider the trade-o¤ between having
high retail margins versus high management/marketing costs of direct-to-consumer sales.
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Online Appendix
Spatial Dispersion of Retail Margins:
Evidence from Turkish Agricultural Prices
1 The Model
Individuals in region r has the following utility Ur maximization out of consuming goods
each denoted by g :
maxUr =
X
g
g (1  exp ( U gr )) (1)
where U gr = q
g
r , q
g
r is the quantity consumed of good g, while 
g and  represent taste
parameters. Maximization of this utility function results in the following demand function:
qgr =
lng

  ln p
g
r

+
Er   1
X
g0
ln

g
0
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0
r

pg
0
rX
g0
pg
0
r
(2)
where pgr represents the price per unit of q
g
r , and Er
 
=
X
g
pgrq
g
r
!
represents the overall
consumer expenditure (i.e., the economic size) in region r. As is evident, the taste parameter
g acts as a demand shifter, while the taste parameter  can be connected to the price
elasticity of demand.1
1In particular, the price elasticity of demand can be calculated as follows:
" =  p
g
r
qgr
@qgr
@pgr
=
1
qgr
which decreases with the quantity consumed qgr . As will be evident below, the price elasticity of demand can
also be connected to the markups according to the following expression:
gr =
"
"  1 =
1
1  qgr
where markups increase with the quantity sold by the retailer.
1
We assume that agricultural goods are homogenous when they leave the production farms;
however, they are distinguished with respect to how they are sold to the nal consumer at
the retail level (e.g., bagged potatoes, boxed strawberries, washed/cleaned spinach, bunched
parsley, etc.). Accordingly, taking the demand function for good g into account, the retailer
in region r maximizes its good g specic prots given by:
gr = q
g
r (p
g
r   cgr)
where cgr represents marginal costs of retailing (implied by a Cobb-Douglas retail-production
function) given as follows:
cgr = (f
g
r )
 (wr)
1 
where f gr represents the traded input price of good g, wr represents the per unit price/cost
of the local input (e.g., wages) that is common across goods, and  is the input share of
traded inputs. The prot maximization results in the following price expression:
pgr = 
g
rc
g
r (3)
where gr = (1  qgr ) 1 represents gross markups (that change with quantity sold). The
retail margin rmgr is implied as follows:
rmgr =
pgr
f gr
= gr

wr
f gr
1 
which is a function of retail markups, traded-input prices and local retail costs.
By combining Equations 2 and 3, together with using the following expression for log
gross markups:2
lngr = ln (1  qgr ) 1  qgr (4)
2Since this approximation is achieved by using ln (1 + x)  x when x is a small number, it has been
supported by studies such as by Yilmazkuday (2015) who has shown that the parameter  is in fact a very
small number.
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the equilibrium price can be written as follows:
ln pgr =
 ln f gr
2
+
lng
2
+
Er +
X
g0
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
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0
r
g0

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0
r
2
X
g0
pg
0
r
+
(1  ) lnwr
2
(5)
where log retail prices depend on traded-input prices f gr , good-specic preferences 
g, and
destination-specic variables consisting of overall local expenditure Er, local retail input
costs wr and aggregated price indices.
The utility function give in Equation 1 suggests that the sub-utility received at the
product level is given by g (1  exp ( U gr )) which di¤ers across locations only due to U gr =
qgr which corresponds to the relative love of variety as shown by Zhelobodko et al. (2012).
3
Wewould like to know the reasons behind the dispersion of U gr across regions, which we accept
as a measure for the dispersion of consumer welfare in this section. We are particularly
interested in the relationship between consumer welfare and retail margins. Accordingly,
using Equations 2 and ??, we can have an expression for our consumer welfare measure of
U gr as follows:
U gr =   ln (f grs + drs)| {z }
Due to Traded-Input Prices
  ln rmgrs| {z }
Due to Retail Margins
+
Er +
X
g0
ln

pg
0
r
g0

pg
0
rX
g0
pg
0
r| {z }
Due to the Real Economic Size
+
lng
2| {z }
Due to Good Characteristics
which is the expression we use in the main text.
3The relative love of variety is dened as follows:
RLV gr =  
qgrU
00
r (q
g
r )
U 0r (q
g
r )
which is at the product and region levels.
3
2 Estimation Methodology
In the case in which data for both retail prices pgr and traded-input prices f
g
r are available,
Equation 5 can be estimated using good xed e¤ects and destination xed e¤ects. However,
our data cover prices received by farmers rather than traded-input prices paid by retailers.
Therefore, we need to connect the prices received by farmers to the traded-input prices paid
by retailers. Following studies such as by Volpe et al. (2013) who show that distance is one of
the most important determinants of transportation costs that a¤ect prices of green groceries,
we achieve the connection between farmer and retail prices by considering transportation
costs that increase with distance and are additive to the prices received by farmers.
Since agricultural goods are homogenous when they leave the production farms, the
retailer in each region searches for the lowest price across potential farmers, by taking into
account the transportation costs between the farmer and the retailer. Accordingly, traded-
input prices f gr for the retailer in region r are connected to the producer prices by the
following expression:
f gr = f
g
rs + drs
where f grs is the producer price of good g at the source region s for the retailer in region
r. It is important to emphasize that f grs changes across destinations due to the retailer (in
each region r) searching for the lowest-price farm, after considering the transportation costs;
hence, the source farm for each retailer may well be di¤erent. Transportation costs are
represented by drs where drs is the distance between the source/producer and the retailer
in miles, and  is the transportation cost per mile per unit of good transported. Substituting
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this expression into the log retail prices, we obtain the following expression:
ln pgr =

2
ln (f grs + drs)| {z }
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+
lng
2| {z }
Good Fixed E¤ects
(6)
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| {z }
Destination Fixed E¤ects
of which stochastic version can be estimated using data on prices, good xed e¤ects, and
destination xed e¤ects, subject to the determination of the source farm. We achieve the
latter by using Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) where we search for the parameter
of  that maximizes the explanatory power of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
that minimizes the contribution of the residual sum of squares. In technical terms, the SMM
estimator is dened as follows:
b = argmin


y ()0Wy ()

where y () = ln pgr   ln bpgr is the distance between the log price data ln pgr and the corre-
sponding tted values ln bpgr for any given , whileW is the identity matrix.
In terms of economic intuition, this strategy corresponds to calculating the arbitrage
opportunities of the retailers across farmers (i.e., searching for the minimum-cost producer)
after controlling for transportation costs. Accordingly, when data for retail-level prices pgr
and farm-level prices f gs for all r, s and g are available, both  and  are identied; thus,
the source region (i.e., the lowest-price farm, after considering transportation costs) and the
source prices f grs (= mins (f
g
rsj g)) for each retailer is identied at the good level.
The standard error of the SMM estimator  is calculated by using a bootstrap technique.
In particular, for each bootstrap b, (i) we resample the log retail prices in Equation 6 by
5
adding its tted values to randomly selected numbers obtained from a normal distribution
with a mean of zero (implied by the OLS regression) and a standard deviation that is equal
to the standard deviation of the residuals, (ii) estimate Equation 6 with the resampled left
hand side in order to obtain the bootstrap b specic  (b). We repeat this exercise 100 times
and compute the bootstrap standard error of  as follows:
S.E. () =
 
1
100
100X
b=1

 (b)  b2! 12
where b is the SMM estimator.
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